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ABSTRACT 
 
Government spending is a reflection of government policy choices. However, the implications of 
government spending growth necessitate an understanding of the drivers of the growth of 
government spending. The present paper modifies the median voter model to explain the growth of 
government spending by introducing foreign aid, public debt, and democracy. The paper argues 
that these variables are important drivers of government spending for developing countries, hence a 
model explaining the growth of government spending of these group of countries that ignores the 
potential impact of foreign aid, public debt and democracy does not capture fully what determines 
the growth of government spending. Such a model is too simplistic and less relevant for policy 
purposes. The paper therefore makes use of annual time series data to determine the long-and short-
run impact of per capita income, tax share, minimum wage, population growth, foreign aid, public 
debt and democracy on the growth of government spending in Ghana over the period 1980-2012. 
The autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) bounds test for cointegration and the error correction 
model (ECM) procedures were used for the estimation. Additionally, the paper provides results of 
generalized forecast error variance decomposition in order to determine the effect of innovations in 
both the dependent and independent variables on the dependent variable. The findings reveal that 
per capita income, tax share, population growth, minimum wage, foreign aid, public debt, and 
democracy are key determinants of the growth of government spending in the long-run. With the 
exception of minimum wage, these variables are also key determinants of the growth of 
government spending in the short-run. Variance decomposition results suggest innovations in per 
capita income and population growth generally account for the largest variations in government 
spending over the horizon considered. Also, innovations in foreign aid, public debt, and democracy 
are responsible for significant variations in government spending. The findings and policy 
recommendations of the paper provide vital information for policy implementation in Ghana.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Governments, like individuals, make choices since choice making is a characteristic of 
economic management. The choice of policy by a government is reflected in its spending 
on the provision of goods and services. What is worrying for many developing countries 
is that government spending often tends to exceed its revenue levels.  
In Ghana, for example, government revenue as a percentage of GDP increased 
from 4.14 per cent in 1980 to 19.06 per cent in 2012. On the other hand, government 
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spending as a percentage of GDP increased from 11.19 per cent in 1980 to 31.19 per cent 
in 2012. The result is not different when we consider 5-year averages for the period 1980-
2009 and 3-year average for the period 2010-2012 (see Table 1). As evident, Ghana’s 
fiscal stance has been the result of expenditure growing faster than revenue on the 
average. It is not surprising therefore that fiscal deficit has been growing strong over the 
years. 
It is also interesting to note that government spending as a percentage of GDP 
generally shows a fluctuating trend from 1980-2012. It followed a fluctuating trend for 
the period 1980-1991 though the levels were relatively lower, averaging 12.79 per cent of 
GDP. It was lowest in 1982 (9.14 per cent). This period coincided with the years of the 
Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) which was targeted at reducing fiscal imbalances. 
For this reason SAP years were those of relatively low government spending. 
Government spending trended upwards and averaged 18.3 per cent of GDP for the period 
1991-1995. This period which coincided with the initial periods of democratization was 
characterized by fiscal indiscipline as the gains from SAP were severely eroded. For the 
period 1995-1999, government spending fell continuously from the previously high value 
of 24.3 per cent of GDP experienced in 1995, the highest for the 1980-1995 period. 
However, it was higher than the levels in the 1980s and the early 1990s, averaging 20.21 
per cent of GDP. It then dipped in 1999 (16.81 per cent) and 2002 (17.1 per cent). The 
fall in government spending in 2002 can be attributed to the tightening of the economy 
after the elections in 2000 and the debt relief that occurred under the HIPC initiative. 
Government spending after 2002 began to fluctuate again though the trend has been 
upward, averaging 23 per cent of GDP for the period 2002-2012. More so, government 
spending, since 2002, peaked in election years (20.54 per cent in 2004, 24.4 per cent in 
2008 and 31.2 per cent in 2012). This is the case because as often argued, election years’ 
often come with increasing government spending. 
TABLE 1: REVENUE AND EXPENDITURE (% OF GDP, 1980-2012) 
Period Revenue Expenditure 
1980-1984 6.50 12.21 
1985-1989 11.75 13.84 
1990-1994 9.78 15.83 
1995-1999 11.18 20.21 
2000-2004 15.72 20.24 
2005-2009 16.73 22.41 
2010-2012 18.30 27.62 
Source: Authors’ elaboration using IMF’s World Economic Outlook (2015) data. 
Growing spending above revenue receipts creates fiscal deficits that could harm 
economic growth (see Adam & Bevan 2005). Besides different ways of financing, 
growing spending may be economically destructive. For instance, if spending is financed 
through increasing taxation, it may serve as a disincentive to work (income taxes), 
investment (property, corporate, and sales taxes), and demand (goods and services taxes). 
If spending is financed through borrowing, it may create growing debts (both domestic 
and external), exchange rate depreciation and depletion of foreign reserves (from external 
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debts and debt servicing), inflation, interest rate hikes and crowding-out (domestic debts), 
among others. Notably, all these are current happenings in the Ghanaian economy (see 
ISSER 2013; IMF 2014). There is also the tendency for growing government spending to 
hinder innovation and allocation of resources, as well as fund “harmful” interventions 
(Ball & Mankiw 1995; Mitchell 2005). Moreover, large government size is not desirable 
as it affects the efficiency and competitiveness of the economy (see Berry & Lowery 
1984; Tanzi & Schuknecht 2000). Finally, the sustainability of Ghana’s rising 
government spending has been recently questioned (see Kwakye & Owoo 2014; ISSER 
2013; Bawumia 2014; IMF 2014). It becomes imperative that what drives the growth of 
government spending are well understood. 
The present paper modifies the median voter model to investigate the long-and 
short-run impact of per capita income, tax share, minimum wage, population growth, 
foreign aid, public debt and democracy (see Wagner 1893; Musgrave & Musgrave 1984; 
Buchanan 1967; Baumol 1967; Feldstein 1996; Remmer 2004; Barua 2005; Mosley 2005) 
on the growth of government spending in Ghana. The paper introduces foreign aid, public 
debt, and democracy into the median voter model given their potential impact on 
government spending in developing countries. We do so because the literature has made it 
clear that (see Hausken et al. 2004; Osei et al. 2005; Battaglini & Coate 2006) these 
variables although ignored by other studies in Ghana (see, for example, Ohene-Manu 
2000; Ofori-Abebrese 2012) are important drivers of the growth of government spending 
in developing countries (Osei et al. 2005; Sakyi 2013). Given these considerations, a 
model explaining the growth of government spending in Ghana that ignores the potential 
impact of foreign aid, public debt and democracy does not capture fully what determines 
the growth of government spending. Such a model is too simplistic and less relevant for 
policy purposes. The current paper is therefore the first attempt at introducing these 
variables in modeling government spending in Ghana. Additionally, the paper provides 
results of generalized forecast error variance decomposition in order to determine the 
effect of innovations in both the dependent and independent variables on the dependent 
variable. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the 
literature on the determinants of the growth of government spending. The estimation 
methods and procedures are presented in Section 3 while Section 4 discusses the empirical 
results. The conclusions and policy recommendations are offered in the last section. 
 
DETERMINANTS OF THE GROWTH OF GOVERNMENT  
SPENDING – A BRIEF SURVEY 
 
Several theories and empirical evidence exist to explain the extent to which per capita 
income, tax share, population growth, minimum wage, foreign aid, public debt, and 
democracy among others explain the growth of government spending. Among these 
theories are mentioned: Wagner’s Law, Baumol’s “Cost Disease”, Fiscal illusion theory, 
Peacock-Wiseman Displacement hypothesis and Development models. Wagner’s law 
(Wagner 1893) associates the growth of government spending to the growth of per capita 
income. The law points to a positive relationship between government spending and per 
capita income (Musgrave & Musgrave 1984), although for low-growth countries, this 
relationship could be negative (see Fan et al. 2013). Some studies find support for 
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Wagner’s law (see Ohene-Manu 2000; Iyare & Lorde 2004; Akitoby et al. 2006; Ghartey 
2007; Lledo et al. 2009; Sakyi 2013), while others do not (see Ziramba 2008; Babatunde 
2008).  
One factor that also leads to increases in government spending is the rise in the 
prices of the inputs used in the production of public sector goods (see Stigler 1970; 
Buchanan & Tullock 1977; Alesina & Perroti 1995). This is explained within Baumol’s 
‘Cost Disease’ theory (Baumol 1967) which indicates that wages increase faster than 
increases in productivity of labour, especially regarding services. Hondroyiannis & 
Papapetrou (2001), Neck & Getzner (2003), Alm & Embaye (2010), and Ofori-Abebresse 
(2012), provide evidence of Baumol’s ‘Cost Disease’.  
Fiscal illusion - often discussed under tax visibility, revenue-complexity, 
revenue-elasticity, flypaper effect, renter illusion, and debt illusion hypotheses (see Oates 
1991; Dollery & Worthington 1996) - postulates that there will be ‘excess’ demand for 
public goods and services if certain features of the tax structure cause taxpayers to 
underestimate how much tax they really pay1 (see Wagner 1976; Pommerehne & 
Schneider 1978). As taxes become more varying in their kind and indirect with respect to 
who pays them, the ability of the average voter to perceive their burden reduces. This will 
cause budgets to increase (Wagner 1976). The implication is that taxpayers will not 
correctly discern the tax-cost and incidence of goods and services provided by the 
government if the proportion of “less visible” taxes in tax revenue exceeds that of the 
“visible taxes” (Pommerehne & Schneider 1978) and if deficit finance exceeds spending. 
Gemmell et al. (1999) and Alm & Embaye (2010) provide evidence for fiscal illusion 
while Ohene-Manu (2000) and Thamae (2013) do not.  
Other theories explaining the growth of government spending are the 
displacement effect (see Peacock & Wiseman 1961) and Development models of 
government spending (see Rostow 1960, and 1971). The displacement effect (see Peacock 
& Wiseman 1961) makes use of a “time pattern” analysis of government spending within 
the framework of a “social disturbance” theory. The theory argues that the median voter 
enjoys the benefits of public goods provided through government spending, but dislikes 
paying taxes to fund such spending. Given this, a tolerable level of taxation is created 
which sets constraints on government spending. The theory further argues that public 
spending will usually show upward trends in “normal times”, but is likely to be disturbed 
during periods of shocks/crisis (may be social upheavals such as war, famine, large-scale 
social disaster, among others). Such periods of shocks/crisis may require increased 
government spending. This may require increased taxation to fund the increased levels of 
government spending. Voters’ deep awareness of the social problems that arise during 
such periods of crisis create an “inspection effect”. Hence, the citizens are likely to regard 
the increased tax levels as acceptable. Therefore, government spending is displaced 
upwards over the shock/crisis periods and is not likely to fall back to original levels even 
after the shock/crisis.  
Rostow (1960, 1971) provides development models of government spending 
growth popularly referred to as the “Five Stages of Growth”. The model argues that 
economic growth is characterized by five basic stages of varying periods; (i) the 
traditional stage, (ii) the precondition for take-off stage, (iii) the take-off stage, (iv) the 
drive to maturity stage, and (v) the age of high mass consumption. These stages can be 
classified into three: the early stages (i.e. the traditional stage and the pre-condition for 
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take-off), the middle stages (i.e. the take-off stage and the drive to maturity) and the 
maturity stage (i.e. the age of high mass consumption). Each of these classes of stages has 
implications on the growth of government spending and is characterized by a degree of 
spending, either public, private or both. For instance, the early stages of economic growth 
and development of an economy are associated with high public sector spending as a 
proportion of total spending. Such spending is necessary to facilitate the “take-off” into 
the middle stages of economic growth and development. Government spending moves 
“hand-in-hand” with private spending in the middle stages of economic growth and 
development. The maturity stage is characterized by more spending on health and welfare 
services compared to capital spending (Rostow 1971). Government spending increases at 
each stage of development due to market failures. Gradually, however, the share of 
government sector spending to GDP decreases over the period of development as total 
spending rises. Given that most developing countries are not yet at the maturity stage, 
government involvement in the economy in terms of spending are particularly crucial. 
Population growth has also been argued to affect government spending
2
 
although the population-spending relationship is theoretically unclear. Notwithstanding, 
this effect is largely argued to depend on the degree of ‘publicness’ of the goods and 
services being produced (see Borcherding & Deacon 1972; Bergstrom & Goodman 1973; 
Feldstein 1996; Marlow & Shiers 1999). Empirical results generally tend to support a 
positive relationship. Hondroyiannis & Papapetrou (2001), Okafor & Eiya (2011), Ofori-
Abebresse (2012), and Thamae (2013) provide support for a positive population-spending 
relationship whiles Ohene-Manu (2000) provides support for a negative relationship. 
Foreign aid has the potential to drive government spending since it increases 
government revenue outlay and also possibly encourages rent-seeking activities through 
its ‘flypaper effect’ (see Heller 1975; Boone 1996; Remmer 2004; Outarra 2006; Fan et 
al. 2013). Unfortunately, efforts to control government spending are likely to be less in 
countries that depend heavily on foreign aid since such countries do not “sweat” for 
the monies they receive. What is worrying is that over reliance on foreign aid inflows 
has the potential of reducing revenue generation effort of aid receiving governments 
(Remmer 2004). However, the fact that foreign aid receipts can make revenue receipts 
unstable also implies that, foreign aid possibly reduces government spending (see 
Feyzioglu et al. 1998; Hudson & Mosley 2008). Morrissey (2015) indicates three 
conclusions on the effects of foreign aid; “aid finances government spending; the 
extent to which aid is fungible is over-stated and even where it is fungible this does 
not appear to make the aid less effective; and there is no systematic effect of aid on 
tax effort” (Morrissey 2015, pp.98). Yohou et al. (2016) and Clist (2016) largely 
support this assertion. The extent of the impact of foreign aid on the countries that 
receive them are often influenced by how their governments ‘behave’ since such aid goes 
through the public sector (McGillivray & Morrissey 2000). In the face of all these 
arguments, a positive relationship between foreign aid and government spending in 
Ghana is posited. With respect to the empirical evidence, the effect of foreign aid on 
government spending depends among others on factors such as the kind of government 
spending being considered (i.e. recurrent against capital expenditure – see Fagernas & 
Roberts 2004; Osei et al. 2005; Outarra 2006; or even developmental consumption 
spending against non-developmental consumption spending – see Outarra 2006), 
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country/region-specific characteristics (see Fagernäs & Roberts 2004; Fan et al. 2013), 
and time-period being considered (see Marc 2012).  
Another driver of government spending is debt financing (see Tobin 1961; 
Breen & Lerner 1973; Blinder & Solow 1973, 1976; Buiter 1977; Barua 2005). Public 
debt allows the financing of government spending, avoiding distortionary taxation 
effect, at least in current periods. Potentially, democracy may also create a situation 
where political parties realizing (with some probability) they may not be able to 
determine future policies (even though they are currently able to do so) engage in 
huge borrowing in their regimes
3
. Therefore as long as borrowing remains a major 
source of government revenue to fund government spending (especially in developing 
countries such as Ghana) debt will continue to increase government spending. 
Mahdavi (2004) finds a negative relationship between debt and government spending for 
47 developing countries while Okafor & Eiya (2011) indicates public debt increases 
government spending in Nigeria.  
Aside the above mentioned determinants it is generally expected that 
government spending increases in democracies in order to meet the needs of the 
electorates (see Hicks & Swank 1992; Isham et al. 1997; Boix 2001, 2003; Stasavage 
2005). As often argued, government spending reduces as a country moves from a purely 
autocratic system to a semi-participatory democracy, while it rises as a country moves 
from a semi-participatory system to a full democracy (see Boone 1996; Hausken et al. 
2004; Blais et al. 2010). Governments that earn voters support in democracies are mostly 
those who spend more on social and community welfare programs (see Hicks & Swank 
1992; Isham et al. 1997; Husted & Kenny 1997; Tavares & Wacziarg 2001; Boix 2001, 
2003; Stasavage 2005; Aidt et al. 2006). It may therefore be said that democracy 
encourages prudent government spending (see Dizaji et al. 2016). Other “costs” of 
democracy which increases government spending include the cost of running local level 
and national parliamentary and presidential elections. This is actually the case in Ghana. 
Another important factor worth considering in democracies is the role of political parties 
(including political trusts and ideologies, see Rudolph & Evans 2005 and Magaloni 2008) 
and institutions (see Mosley 2005), as they remain key drivers of the growth of 
government spending in democracies. Effective institutions largely influence the levels of 
government spending. Such institutions provide checks and balances on the levels and 
frequencies of government spending behavior. What is worrying, however, is that these 
institutions may also act as veils that governments can evade
4
. There is evidence of a 
positive democracy-spending relationship (see Lindert 1994, 2004; Gonzalez 2002; 
Brown and Hunter 2004; Rudra & Haggard 2005). However, Mulligan et al. (2004) find 
no statistically significant difference between government spending in democracies and 
those in non-democracies. 
METHODOLOGY 
 
Theoretical Background and Model Specification 
 
The Median Voter Model follows from the Median Voter Theorem (MVT). The MVT is 
a well-known political theory that explains the importance of the median voter’s choice 
in public choice decisions. As stated by Romer & Rosenthal (1979), the theory is 
generally attributed to Hotelling (1929), and Bowen (1943). MVT argues that there are 
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basically two characteristics of public goods. The first is that, the costs of providing these 
goods are mostly shared among community members. Secondly, how much to be 
supplied is also determined collectively. The enormity of the decision to be made in 
determining the quantity and costs of providing public goods is evident from the fact that 
every community is made up of different individuals with varying tastes, wealth levels, 
and “conflicting” interests, among others. This is crucial because given individual 
demand and costs conditions, the quantities supplied of public goods is equal to the 
“median of the quantities demanded by its citizens” for any community and that “the 
median quantities demanded is the quantity demanded by the citizen with the median 
income” (Bergstrom & Goodman 1973, pp. 281). This does not preclude the fraction of 
the cost or tax price to be borne by the median consumer given his/her demand for the 
public good. Therefore, by the arguments of the MVT, how many public goods are 
provided is determined by the income of the median consumer in the community. Hence, 
all the government would have to do is to simply find that one voter whose preferences 
for public goods is considered exactly in the “middle” of the distribution of the society’s 
preferences, and provide the amount of public goods that voter prefers. Romer & 
Rosenthal (1979) indicate that “the great advantage of the median voter paradigm is that 
it allows one to analyze social problems via the preferences of a single individual, the 
pivotal median voter”. Given that a country is made up of several communities, these 
community level arguments can be aggregated for countries as the conditions and 
circumstances surrounding the two are similar (see Borcherding & Deacon 1972; 
Bergstrom & Goodman 1973). It must be stated that the arguments made by the MVT 
will hold under a majority voting system (see Niskanen 1971; Bergstrom & Goodman 
1973; Kurz 1974; Romer & Rosenthal 1978) like in most democracies. 
In what follows, we follow Borcherding & Deacon (1972) and Bergstrom & 
Goodman (1973) and state the median voter’s demand function for public goods and 
services as: 
 
X MC Y Z                                                                                                               (1) 
 
 
X = the quantity of public goods and services 
C = the perceived unit cost of public goods and services paid by the median voter 
Y = the per capita income  
Z = other exogenous conditions affecting the demand for public goods and services 
M is a scale parameter and , ,   and  are parameters of the demand function. 0  ,
0  , 0  .   
X and C are unobserved. However, one can safely assume the cost of providing 
public goods and services, X, to have a unit marginal cost equal to s . We further assume 
the median voter’s share of the unit cost of public goods and services to be  . With these 
assumptions, the median voter pays a perceived cost of public goods and services given 
as: 
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C s                                                                                                                             (2) 
 
Hence, government spending per capita is now given as 𝑠𝑋. 
We combine equations (1) and (2) to obtain: 
1sX M s Y Z                                                                                                         (3) 
Borcherding & Deacon (1972) and Bergstrom & Goodman (1973) also assume 
  to be equivalent to the per capita ratio of total government tax revenue to total 
government spending ( )(1/ )Q N , where Q is the share of total government tax revenue 
in total government spending and N is the number of voter-tax payers. The resulting 
equation is stated as:  
 
( )(1/ )Q N                                                                                                                 (4) 
It is assumed in equation (4) that voters are either unaware of or indifferent to 
the tax incidence of current fiscal deficits. From equation (4), when a balanced budget is 
considered, it is expected that the perceived unit cost of government spending reduces as 
the population increases. 
Finally, Borcherding & Deacon (1972) and Bergstrom & Goodman (1973) 
assume the unit cost of providing public goods and services is determined by the average 
wage rate ( )W  in the private sector and the number of voter-tax payers. That is: 
 
s DW N             0 1; 0                                                                              (5) 
Where D  is a scale parameter,  measures the ‘productivity effect’ or the extent 
of ‘Cost Disease’, with measuring the ‘crowding effect’ or the degree of ‘publicness’. 
Putting equations (4) and (5) into (3) and assuming sX G produces: 
 
(1 )1[ . ] [ ]sX G M Q DW N Y Z
N
                                                                     (6) 
 
(1 ) [ (1 ) ] (1 )( )G MD Y Q N W Z                                                                           (7) 
Equation (7) represents the specification of the median voter model as given by 
Borcherding & Deacon (1972) and Bergstrom & Goodman (1973) as adopted in the 
literature by several authors (see Niskanen 1978; Borcherding 1985; Ashworth 1995). 
However, as already indicated in Section 1, the median voter model developed here does 
not capture fully what determines the growth of government spending in developing 
countries, of which Ghana is not an exception. For this reason, we specify Z to include 
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foreign aid ( )AID , public debt ( )DEBT , and democracy ( )DEM . Therefore the 
modified median voter model is given as: 
 
 
(1 ) [ (1 ) ] (1 )( )G MD Y Q N W AID DEBT DEM                                          (8) 
The estimable form of equation (8) in logarithm terms is given by: 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7ln ln ln ln ln lnt t t t t t t t tG Y Q N W AID DEBT DEM                    (9) 
where (1 )
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7ln( ), , , [ (1 ) ], (1 ), , ,MD
                           
, are parameters, t is the error term, ln  is a natural logarithmic operator. 0  is the 
constant term since M and D  are scale parameters. 
1 0  , implies the presence of 
Wagner’s law but
1 0   means Wagner’s law is absent. 2 0   implies the presence of 
fiscal illusion but
2 0  implies the absence of fiscal illusion. 3 0  , implies services 
are considered ‘pure public goods’, 
3 1  implies the cost of providing public goods is 
proportional to the population being served and 
3 1   implies there is a crowding out 
effect associated with the unit cost of providing government goods and services. 
3 0   
implies there are economies of scale when government services are being provided. When
4 0  , private sector productivity rises faster than that of the public sector. When 
4 1  , productivity does not increase but when 4 0  , public sector productivity is 
higher than the private sector. Also, 
4 0  indicates income elastic demand for 
government services but
4 0  indicates income inelastic demand for government 
services. 
5 0   indicates the absence of fungibility while 5 0  shows evidence of 
fungibility. There is evidence for ‘deficit financing’ when
6 0  but there is no such 
evidence when
6 0  . 7 0  for a country moving from autocracy to semi-participatory 
democracy, and  
7 0   for a country moving from semi-participatory democracy to full 
democracy. Apart from
2  which is expected to be negative and statistically significant, 
the coefficient of all other variables are expected to be positive and statistically 
significant, a priori. 
 
Data 
 
Annual data on Ghana for the period 1980-2012 are used. The dependent variable, 𝐺, is 
measured as real total government spending per capita. Real total government spending 
per capita is used in order to give a reflection of the trend in government spending 
growth in constant terms and also to reflect the annual government spending on the 
average citizen. This definition helps put the study into perspective, showing how much 
the average citizen ‘benefits’ from the ever increasing government spending. This 
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measure has been used by other authors (see Craigwell 1991 for Barbados; Ohene-Manu 
2000 and Ofori-Abebrese 2012 for Ghana; Provopoulos 1982 and Hondroyiannis & 
Papapetrou 2001 for Greece; Neck & Getzner 2003 for Austria; Alm & Embaye 2010 for 
South Africa; and Thamae 2013 for Lesotho). 𝑌 is measured as real GDP per capita. 
Using real GDP per capita to proxy income is common in the literature (see Niskanen 
1978; Hondroyiannis & Papapetrou 2001; Alm & Embaye 2010; Thamae 2013; Fan et al. 
2013). 𝑄 is measured as the ratio of total government revenue to total government 
spending. It is used as an explanatory variable because it is assumed that deficit 
financing may cause the average voter to be fiscally ‘illuded’. Ohene-Manu (2000), Alm 
and Embaye (2010) and Thamae (2013) have used this measure. Similar to Ofori-
Abebrese (2012) we use the growth rate of the population instead of the level as it is 
actually this variable that matters for the growth of government spending (see 
Borcherding 1985). Its coefficient measures the degree of ‘publicness’ of government 
services. The price of public goods and services also determines the growth of 
government spending. The study therefore uses the minimum wage (𝑊) as a proxy for 
the price of public goods and services. The same variable was used by Ofori-Abebrese 
(2012). The foreign aid variable, 𝐴𝐼𝐷 is measured as the net Official Development 
Assistant (ODA) per capita. The public debt variable, 𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇 is measured by the share of 
total (domestic plus external) central government debt to GDP. The most popular 
measures of democracy used by various authors are Polity2 (see Marshall & Jaggers 
2014), Political Rights and Civil Liberties (see Freedom House 2014). We use principal 
component analysis to derive a composite index as a proxy for democracy (𝐷𝐸𝑀). A 
linear combination of the optimally-weighted initial variables is given by the first 
principal component. This point to a good proxy for all the three measures of democracy 
since it accounts for approximately 94.21% of the variations in the original democracy 
indicators. Data on total government spending and total government revenue were 
obtained from the International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook data files 
(2015). Data on real GDP per capita, foreign aid, and population growth are obtained 
from the World Bank’s World Development Indicator, WDI (2014). Data on minimum 
wage was sourced from Wage Indicator Foundation. Polity2 data is obtained from Polity 
IV Project (Marshall & Jaggers 2014) while those on political rights and civil liberties are 
obtained from the Freedom House (2014). Data on public debt is obtained from Reinhart 
et al. (2010) for the period 1980-2005 and ISSER (2013) for the period 2006-2012. 
 
Estimation Strategy 
 
We propose ARDL bounds test for cointegration (Pesaran et al. 2001) and the error 
correction model (ECM) for this study due to several advantages it has over other 
cointegration approaches which requires strictly 𝐼(1) stationary variables. The ARDL 
bounds test for cointegration approach is not only robust in the presence of strictly 𝐼(0), 
𝐼(1) or a mixture of both but also appropriate for small sample study (which is the case in 
the present study with only 33 annual observations). To be sure that the variables in 
equation (9) are not 𝐼(2) stationary or even more we first investigate the time series 
properties of these variables. This is crucial when specifying an econometric model in the 
face of ARDL bounds test for cointegration. To achieve this, the parametric Augmented 
Dickey-Fuller (ADF) by Dickey & Fuller (1979; 1981) and the non-parametric Phillips-
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Perron (PP) by Phillips & Perron (1998) unit root tests are used. For both test the null 
hypothesis of unit root (non-stationarity) is tested against the alternative hypothesis of 
the absence of unit root (stationarity).  
Once the conditions of the unit root properties of the variables in equation (9) is 
satisfied, we proceed with the steps involved in the ARDL bounds test for cointegration. 
In the first step we estimate the conditional ECM of the following form by OLS by 
assuming 𝑌 and 𝑋 are the dependent and the independent variables in equation (9) 
respectively: 
 
0 1 1 1 1
1 0
k k
t t i m t i t m t t
i i
Y Y X Y X        
 
                                         (10) 
Where   represents the first difference operator, 𝑚 is the number of regressors, and t  
represents the error term.  
In the second step we test the null hypothesis that 
0 1: 0mH    against the 
alternative hypothesis that 
1 1: 0mH    by the use of F-test. That is, the coefficients 
of the lagged level variables are restricted to equal zero. Stochastic simulations are used 
to estimate the asymptotic distribution of the F-statistic which follows a non-standard 
distribution with a null of no cointegration, whether the variables involved are strictly 
I(0) or I(1) or both. Microfit 5.0 is used for the estimation. Two ‘extreme’ cases are set - 
the upper and lower critical value bounds. The null hypothesis of no cointegration is 
rejected if the computed F-statistic is greater than the upper critical value bound. The null 
hypothesis cannot however be rejected if the F-statistic is less than the lower critical 
bound. Inconclusive deductions will arise if the computed F-statistic lies within the 
critical value bounds. Given cointegration, the last step involves an estimation of the 
long-run and short-run coefficients of the chosen ARDL model. Per the suggestion of 
Pesaran & Pesaran (2009), the optimal lag structure ( )k is selected using the Schwartz 
Bayesian Criterion (SBC) as this provides a more parsimonious specification of the 
model in small samples.  
 
Variance Decomposition 
 
To further explain the growth of government spending in Ghana, the study provides 
Generalized Forecast Error Variance Decomposition estimates for government spending. 
The results obtained follow the error-variance decomposition methods suggested by 
Koop et al. (1996) and developed further by Pesaran & Shin (1998). This method is 
variables-order-invariant as far as the Vector Error Correction Model (VECM) estimates 
are concerned. The analysis explains the amount of the forecast error variance for the 
dependent variable explained by shocks to each of the independent variables and the 
dependent variable itself for a continuum of time horizons. That is for h-steps ahead, 
innovations to the dependent variable are decomposed into aspects arising from the 
dependent variable and those that can be attributed to the independent variables. 
Moreover, this method is able to account for the effects of simultaneous innovations. It is 
also able to provide better results within VAR framework compared to existing 
traditional approaches. Significantly, this paper notes that even though causality tests 
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may be explored by other studies, they are deficient given the fact that such tests fail to 
capture the relative strength of the causal relationship so obtained over and above the 
time period considered. Such strengths are captured by forecast error variance 
decomposition estimates over the entire time horizons. Finally, the methodology is also 
appropriate where cointegration relationship is obtained between and among variables in 
a system (see Pesaran & Shin 1998). 
The test is done to investigate the effects of innovations (shocks) to per capita 
income, tax share, population growth, minimum wage, foreign aid, public debt, 
democracy and government spending on government spending. Particularly, where 
innovations in per capita income, tax share, and minimum wage explain significant 
portions of the variations in government spending, further evidence of Wagner’s Law, 
Fiscal Illusion, and Baumol’s “Cost Disease” are found. In addition, if shocks 
(innovations) in foreign aid, public debt and democracy significantly explain portions of 
innovations in government spending, the results further support earlier assertions made 
that omitting these variables in any study that explains the growth of government 
spending in developing countries is likely to produce bias and naive results. It is expected 
that the largest variations in the dependent variable are explained by innovations to the 
dependent variable. 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS 
 
In this section, we present and discuss the empirical results on the determinants of the 
growth of government spending in Ghana
5
. We begin with a discussion of the results of 
the unit root and cointegration test, followed by the long-and short-run estimates, and the 
model adequacy, reliability and stability tests.  
 
Unit Root and Cointegration Test Results 
We present in Table 2 the results of the ADF and PP unit root test. Both test results clearly 
shows that the variables in equation (9) are integrated of either order one or zero (i.e. 𝐼[1] 
or 𝐼[0]) regardless of whether we include trend or not in the underlying unit root test. The 
unit root test results lend support to the use of the ARDL bounds test for cointegration 
relationship. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
115 
TABLE 2: UNIT ROOT TEST RESULTS 
 
Variabl
e 
ADF PP 
Level First Difference Level First Difference 
Trend No  
Trend 
Trend No  
Trend 
Trend No 
Trend 
Trend No 
Trend 
𝑙𝑛𝐺 -
4.454**
* 
0.324 _ -
5.600**
* 
-
4.383**
* 
0.324 _ -
6.675**
* 
𝑙𝑛𝑌 -0.203 3.010** -
5.833**
* 
_ -2.422 3.010** -
3.398** 
_ 
𝑙𝑛𝑄 -
4.406**
* 
-
4.669**
* 
_ _ -
4.404**
* 
-
4.682**
* 
_ _ 
𝑁 -
4.119** 
-0.389 _ -
4.391**
* 
-3.557 -1.784 -
3.576** 
-
3.872**
* 
𝑙𝑛𝑊 -1.275 -1.663 -
5.816**
* 
-
5.480**
* 
-1.264 -1.752 -
6.312**
* 
-
5.480**
* 
𝑙𝑛𝐴𝐼𝐷 -2.369 -1.363 -
7.708**
* 
-
7.820**
* 
-2.444 -1.363 -
7.675**
* 
-
7.629**
* 
𝑙𝑛𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇 -1.420 -1.694 -
5.660**
* 
-
5.495**
* 
-1.424 -1.705 -
5.660**
* 
-
5.496**
* 
𝐷𝐸𝑀 -
4.437**
* 
-
4.921**
* 
_ _ -
6.180**
* 
-
5.951**
* 
_ _ 
Source: Authors. 
Note: *** (**) indicates rejection of the null hypothesis of unit root at 1 per cent (5 per cent) levels of 
statistical significance. 
 
Cointegration Test Results 
 
The results from the cointegration test using the ARDL bounds test for cointegration 
relationship are given in Table 3. The ARDL (1, 1, 2, 2, 2, 1, 0, 0) is selected based on 
Schwarz Bayesian Criterion (SBC) with a maximum of 2 lags. As evident, the results 
clearly show that the computed F-statistic is greater than the upper bound critical value at 
5 per cent significance level. Therefore, the null hypothesis of no cointegration is 
rejected. It can thus be concluded that the variables in equation (9) are cointegrated.  
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TABLE 3: ARDL BOUNDS TEST FOR COINTEGRATION RELATIONSHIP 
 
Test statistic         6.312** 
Source: Authors 
Note: ** implies that the null hypothesis of no cointegration is rejected at 5 per cent level of statistical 
significance. The ARDL model gives the 95 per cent lower and upper bounds as 2.881 and 4.380 
respectively. 
 
The Estimated Long-and Short-Run Results 
 
Tables 4 and 5 show the results for the long-and short run estimates respectively. The 
long-run results show a positive and statistically significant coefficient of the per capita 
income (Y) variable at 1 per cent level of significance. This satisfies the a priori 
expectation and indicates the existence of Wagner’s law. This outcome is not surprising 
because the period studied covers most periods during and after the SAP which generally 
shows positive economic growth in the presence of a relatively peaceful and stable 
economic environment. Such an environment is growth enhancing and hence, generally 
leads to a rise in per capita income and correspondingly, per capita government spending. 
The result is not different when we consider that of the short-run. Hence, government 
spending increases along with the economic expansion of Ghana in both the long-and 
short-run. The results confirm similar evidence indicated by Ohene-Manu (2000) and 
Ghartey (2007) for Ghana, and Thamae (2013) for Lesotho, and Sakyi (2013) for other 
developing countries. It however contradicts the findings of Ofori-Abebrese (2012) for 
Ghana. 
The long-run coefficient of the tax share variable (Q) is negative and statistically 
significant at 1 per cent level. This result which shows the absence of fiscal illusion 
satisfies the a priori expectation. This may give credence to the old Ricardian question 
that current generations properly discount the incidence of debt on future tax liabilities 
(see Barro 1974). In other words, the citizenry demand less government spending 
possibly because they know that they will eventually ‘pay’ for such spending. For 
instance, evidence on total tax revenue including exemptions and including oil for the 
2012 fiscal year lends support to the fact that the proportion of ‘less visible’ taxes in tax 
revenue is less than the proportion of ‘visible’ taxes in tax revenue. Less visible taxes in 
Ghana include VAT, excise tax and NHIL, while visible taxes include taxes on property 
and income (such as personal income tax, company tax) and international trade taxes. For 
the 2012 fiscal year alone, receipts from less visible taxes was GHC 4,212.0 million 
(representing 33.65% of total tax revenue including exemptions and including oil of GHC 
12, 517.3 million). Receipts from visible taxes for the same fiscal year was GHC 8,305.2 
million, representing 66.35% of the total tax revenue including exemptions and including 
oil, stated above. The short-run coefficient also indicates there is no fiscal illusion. 
However, the coefficient of the ‘lag’ effect of tax share (∆Q1) increases government 
spending in the short-run, implying fiscal illusion is present with a lag. The implication of 
the result from the ‘lag’ effect is that Ghanaians are able to discount future tax burden 
arising from previous government services, making such burdens look less to the current 
generation. The long-run results confirm evidence on Ghana provided by Ohene-Manu 
(2000). It also confirms evidence provided by Alm & Embaye (2010) for South Africa 
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and Thamae (2013) for Lesotho. The short-run coefficient however contradicts evidence 
indicated by Alm & Embaye (2010) and Thamae (2013). 
The long-run coefficient on the minimum wage (W) variable is positive and 
statistically significant at 1 per cent level. This is consistent with the a priori expectation 
and implies that high cost of input in the public sector affects the growth of government 
spending in Ghana positively. This confirms the situation in Ghana where public sector 
productivity is generally perceived to be low relative to that of the private sector. The 
result lends support to the ‘Baumol’s Cost Disease’ hypothesis. Therefore, over the 
period of the study, the growth of government spending was positively influenced by 
increases in the cost of providing public goods and services. In the short-run, however, 
the coefficient is not statistically significant. Ohene-Manu (2000) makes similar assertion 
from his results on Ghana which this paper largely confirms (see also Alm & Embaye 
2010, for South Africa; Ramey 2009, for Nigeria; and Ofori-Abebrese 2012, for Ghana). 
The short-run coefficient contradicts the results of Hondroyiannis & Papapetrou (2001) 
for Greece, Alm & Embaye (2010) for South Africa; and Ohene-Manu (2000) and Ofori-
Abebrese (2012) for Ghana. 
The long-run coefficient of the growth rate of population (N) variable is positive 
and statistically significant at 5 per cent level. This satisfies the a priori expectation, and 
the coefficient (because it is greater than unity) indicates that there is a ‘crowding out’ 
effect of providing government goods and services. In other words, the unit cost of 
government spending on the provision of public goods and services may be over and 
above what is necessary and needed. This result can also be explained by several 
conditions. For example, the proportion of the population aged 65 and above is rising 
(2.9% of the total population in 1980 and 3.9% of the total population in 2012; WDI 
2014). This may have necessitated increasing government social services for the aged. 
Possibly, the rise in government spending may be coming from increasing government 
consumption spending due to the increasing size of the population in general and 
indicates that the cost of government services is rising on the average. Finally, the 
positive sign of the estimated coefficient shows that economies of scale do not exist in 
the provision of government services. Not surprising, the short-run result largely 
confirms that of the long-run. Notwithstanding, the coefficient of the lagged population 
growth variable (∆N1) is negative, indicating the existence of economies of scale in the 
provision of public goods and services in the short-run but with one period lag. Similar 
evidence is provided by Ofori-Abebrese (2012) for Ghana, and Fan et al. (2013) for other 
developing countries. However, the results from Ohene-Manu (2000) for Ghana and 
Hondroyiannis & Papapetrou (2001) for Greece indicate otherwise. 
The long-run coefficient of the foreign aid (AID) variable is positive and 
statistically significant at 1 per cent level of significance. This is consistent with the a 
priori expectation and shows that in the long-run, receipts from foreign aid lead to 
increases in government spending in Ghana. This is so because it increases the amount of 
revenue available to spend. The result proves the importance of foreign aid as a 
determinant of the growth of government spending and confirms similar evidence given 
by Osei et al. (2005) for Ghana, and Hudson & Mosley (2008) and Fan et al. (2013) for 
developing countries. The result for the short-run is not different from that of the long-
run, and consistent with the result provided by Fan et al. (2013) for developing countries. 
Interestingly, the result for the lag coefficient of foreign aid (∆AID1) indicates a negative 
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relationship between foreign aid receipts and the growth of government spending in 
Ghana but with a period lag.  
 
TABLE 4: THE ESTIMATED LONG-RUN COEFFICIENTS USING THE ARDL 
APPROACH 
           Regressor Coefficient Standard Error 
 𝑙𝑛𝑌   4.009*** 0.439 
 𝑙𝑛𝑄   -1.358*** 0.322 
 𝑁         1.926** 0.467 
 𝑙𝑛𝑊    0.036***  0.009 
 𝑙𝑛𝐴𝐼𝐷    0.590***  0.094 
 𝑙𝑛𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇    0.323***  0.067 
 𝐷𝐸𝑀  0.278** 0.102 
 𝐶      -34.902***          4.375 
Source: Authors 
Notes: 𝑙𝑛𝐺  is the dependent variable. ***(**) indicate rejection of the null hypothesis at 1 per cent (5 
per cent) level of statistical significance. 
 
The long-run coefficient of the public debt (DEBT) variable is positive and 
statistically significant at 1 per cent level. This is consistent with the a priori expectation 
and indicates that government spending in Ghana is partly funded by government 
borrowing. These debt increases the revenue outlay available to fund proposed spending. 
This result is not surprising given the fact that borrowing has always remained a major 
source of government revenue in Ghana and has been increasing tremendously in recent 
years. It is also possible that Ghana’s democracy limits the ability of incumbent 
governments to fully internalize the future cost of increasing debt-financed government 
spending. The results therefore may be indicating a possible ‘redistributive uncertainty’ 
effect as stated by Lizzeri (1999) and further emphasized by Battaglini & Coate (2006). 
The short-run result is not different from that of the long-run, although the long-run 
coefficient as expected is much greater. The result confirms similar evidence given by 
Okafor & Eiya (2011) for Nigeria but contradicts that of Mahdavi (2004) for developing 
countries.  
The long-run coefficient of the democracy (DEM) variable is positive and 
statistically significant at 1 per cent level. This satisfies the a priori expectation and 
indicates that democracy has positive influence on the growth of government spending in 
Ghana. This result is not surprising given the fact that Ghana practices a mix of 
parliamentary and presidential democracy with a hugely polarized political environment. 
Particularly, government policy is characterized by opportunistic cycles in economic 
policy with spending increasing mostly in election years. Political interest groups begin 
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to emerge, demand and enforce some levels of government spending when their ‘parties’ 
are in power, mostly during near-election and election years. Governments usually ‘bow’ 
to such pressures since they risk losing elections if they do not succumb. Possibly too, the 
citizenry under democracies are now better able to demand their ‘economic rights’, 
implying governments must increase spending in order to ‘appease’ the majority if they 
want to retain power. In addition, institutions in Ghana that are supposed to act as checks 
and balances on government spending levels are either ineffective or totally ‘blunt’ in 
their enforcements. Governments are therefore able to spend even more under 
democracy. The situation is further worsened by corruption which encourages corrupt 
and rent seeking behavior among the political elite. All these cause government spending 
to increase in Ghana. Given that democracy is expensive, the future implication of this 
result is that government spending is likely to increase as Ghana becomes more and more 
democratic. This result is also not different from that obtained for the short-run. The 
evidence here is similar to those indicated by Gonzalez (2002) and Brown & Hunter 
(2004) for developing countries.  
TABLE 5: SHORT-RUN RESULTS USING THE ARDL APPROACH 
          Regressor    Coefficient        Standard error 
𝛥𝑙𝑛𝑌 1.740** 0.708 
𝛥𝑙𝑛𝑄 -0.371*** 0.094 
𝛥𝑙𝑛𝑄1 0.416*** 0.080 
𝛥𝑁 2.560*** 0.728 
𝛥𝑁1                    -2.679***                      0.535 
𝛥𝑙𝑛𝑊                    0.003 0.008 
𝛥𝑙𝑛𝐴𝐼𝐷                    0.263*** 0.080 
𝛥𝑙𝑛𝐴𝐼𝐷1                    -0.263*** 0.064 
𝛥𝑙𝑛𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇                    0.228*** 0.046 
𝛥𝐷𝐸𝑀                    0.197*** 0.061 
𝑒𝑐𝑚(−1)                    -0.707*** 0.094 
𝐹 − 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐                    24.583***  
Source: Authors 
Note: 𝛥𝑙𝑛𝐺 is the dependent variable.***(**) implies the null hypothesis is rejected at 1 per 
cent (5 per cent) level of statistical significance. 
 
The statistical properties of the ARDL model determine its adequacy and 
reliability. For this reason, we have conducted several diagnostic and reliability tests on 
the estimated ARDL model. We test for functional form, normality, and the presence of 
serial correlation and heteroscedasticity by the use of Ramsey’s RESET test, the skewness 
and kurtosis of residuals, Lagrange multiplier, and regression of squared residuals on 
squared fitted values respectively. As evident (see Table 6) the estimated model is free 
from any of these diagnostic problems. The results are also not ‘spurious’ due to the 
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presence of a cointegration relationship. The coefficient of the error correction term, 
ECM(-1), is negative and statistically significant at 1 per cent level. This gives further 
proof of the cointegration results. In addition, it is reasonably large in absolute value and 
shows a high speed of adjustment in the long-run equilibrium every year after a short-run 
shock. Specifically, long-run equilibrium will adjust by 71 per cent every year after a 
short-run shock. The CUSUM and CUSUMSQ results clearly indicate no evidence of 
structural instability of the estimated ARDL model over the sample period.  
 
TABLE 6: MODEL DIAGNOSTICS AND RELIABILITY TESTS 
Test Statistic Results 
Serial Correlation 0.865 
(0.352) 
Functional Form 3.238 
(0.072) 
Normality 2.020 
(0.364) 
Heteroscedasticity 0.409 
(0.522) 
Source: Authors. 
Note: In parentheses are probability values 
 
      FIGURE 1. CUSUM                                FIGURE 2. CUSUMSQ                                                                      
 
 
Variance Decomposition Results 
 
Results for the variance decomposition analysis are given in Table 7. Ten (10) horizons 
are used. As already stated, the analysis presented here provides a novelty to the subject 
matter considered by the study. Such analysis is particularly important for a study such as 
this that attempts to explain the determinants of the growth of government spending. This 
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is especially so given the fact that a variance decomposition analysis will clearly show 
over a time horizon, the strength of the contributions of innovations in each of the 
variables including the dependent variable, to variations in the dependent variable. 
TABLE 7: GENERALIZED FORECAST ERROR VARIANCE 
DECOMPOSITION FOR VARIABLE  
𝒍𝒏𝑮 
Horizon 𝑙𝑛𝐺 𝑙𝑛𝑌 𝑙𝑛𝑄 𝑁 𝑙𝑛𝑊 𝑙𝑛𝐴𝐼𝐷 𝑙𝑛𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇 𝐷𝐸𝑀 
1 84.052 13.555 4.5651 22.515 0.76555 37.616 30.922 28.293 
2 59.834 23.008 18.888 40.748 0.72844 37.188 20.829 16.228 
3 51.294 25.164 20.947 46.766 1.3319 37.471 22.342 11.448 
4 47.012 27.060 17.870 45.707 1.6060 37.608 25.741 9.4851 
5 43.493 29.301 15.699 43.738 1.4112 34.847 27.777 8.8891 
6 40.195 34.217 14.124 42.527 1.3836 32.065 26.712 8.2406 
7 35.433 40.233 13.134 42.579 1.4432 28.314 24.040 8.6370 
8 30.656 45.494 12.655 42.934 1.4084 24.584 21.218 9.8952 
9 26.235 49.514 12.082 42.703 1.4043 21.065 18.635 11.969 
10 22.367 53.225 11.435 42.150 1.5313 17.969 16.297 13.658 
Note: Based on 31 observations from 1982 to 2012. Order of VAR = 2. 
 
From the results, from time horizons 1 to 6, innovations to the dependent 
variable provide the largest explanations to variations in itself, even though the strength 
reduces from 84.05 per cent in period 1 to 40.20 per cent in period 6. Hence over the 10 
horizons, the influence of shocks to the dependent variables on itself reduces from 84.05 
per cent to 22.37 per cent. For horizons 7 to 10, shocks to Y account for from 40.23 per 
cent to 53.23 per cent of the forecast error variance of G. It is also important to note that 
over the entire period, shocks to W accounted for the least variations in government 
spending even though it increased from 0.77 percent to 1.53 per cent over the entire 
horizon. 
We discuss the implications of the estimates obtained for the independent 
variables. For period 1, shocks to AID accounted for the highest (37.62 per cent) forecast 
error variation of government spending, with minimum wage responsible for the least 
(0.77 per cent). For periods 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7, innovations to N accounted for 40.75, 
46.77, 45.71, 43.74, 42.53, and 42.58 respectively of the variations in G, the highest for 
the periods. For periods 2 to 5, the variance decomposition results show AID, Y, DEBT, 
Q, DEM, and W followed after N in that order from the second highest to the least in 
terms of their contributions to variations in G. For periods 8 and 9, the order changed, 
with descending order as Y, N, AID, DEBT, Q, DEM and W. However, for period 10, 
shocks to DEM (13.658) accounted for more variations in G compared to Q (11.435), 
even though the order of contributions of the other variables remained same as in periods 
8 and 9. The contributions of innovations in Y, Q and M to variations in G increased 
throughout the entire horizon, while that for DEM fell from periods 1 to 8 and rose again 
for periods 9 and 10. The contributions of AID fell throughout while those for DEBT and 
N generally fluctuate. 
As already stated, the significant contributions of innovations in Y, Q, and M to 
the forecast error variance of G give further evidence to Wagner’s Law, Fiscal illusion, 
and Baumol’s “Cost Disease” respectively. The generally large contributions of N also 
point to a strong influence of “crowding-out” effect of government spending. Also, 
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gradually, shocks to DEBT seem to be catching up with shocks to AID in accounting for 
variations in G. Finally, there is strong evidence for the importance of AID, DEM and 
DEBT as determinants of the growth of government spending in Ghana and in 
developing countries as a whole, given the significant effect of innovations in each of 
them on government spending. Therefore, again, they cannot be ignored as determinants 
of government spending. 
 
CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
This paper has investigated the determinants of the growth of government spending in 
Ghana for the period 1980-2012. In order to address this issue, it has made use of a 
modified median voter model that controls for the impact of foreign aid, public debt, and 
democracy. In addition, the paper has employed the autoregressive distributed lag bounds 
test for cointegration and the error correction model appropriate for small sample time 
series study and variables integrated of order one, zero, or a mixture of both. The results 
suggest per capita income, tax share, population growth, minimum wage, foreign aid, 
public debt, and democracy are key determinants of the growth of government spending 
in the long-run. With the exception of minimum wage, these variables are also key 
determinants of the growth of government spending in the short-run. Variance 
decomposition results suggest innovations in per capita income and population growth 
generally account for the largest variations in government spending over the horizon 
considered. In addition, innovations in foreign aid, public debt, and democracy account 
for significant variations in government spending. 
From a policy oriented point of view the absence of fiscal illusion over the 
period studied implies the government cannot continue raising a huge proportion of its tax 
revenue from ‘visible tax’. Therefore, more creative, diversified, and innovative avenues 
of revenue generation must be explored by the revenue generating agencies. There must 
also be deliberate and sustained efforts at increasing productivity in the public sector 
above the cost of providing public services and activities. This is so because, efficient 
delivery of public goods and services will ensure that wages commensurate to 
productivity and hence, reduce the relative price of public goods and services so as to 
reduce growth in government spending. In this case, better technology can be introduced 
while bureaucracy is reduced. There should also be conscious efforts by government, 
policy makers, civil societies and policy think tanks to monitor and control the use of 
foreign aid and debt inflows in order to ensure that they are productively spent. In the face 
of threats of aid fungibility, policy makers must ensure foreign aid receipts only serve to 
‘augment’ shortfalls in generated domestic revenues needed to fund government’s 
anticipated spending and not serve as substitute for domestic revenue generation efforts. 
Finally, it will be appropriate that government ensure democracy encourages the 
formulation and implementation of more social and community programs instead of 
encouraging rent-seeking behavior among the political elite. 
The results notwithstanding, it is important to note that this paper relied heavily 
on aggregated variables. Given this, future studies may try to instead explain the growth 
of the various components of government spending. Such an in-depth investigation will 
enhance the knowledge base on the factors that explain the growth of government 
spending in Ghana. 
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ENDNOTES 
 
1
 As stated by Buchanan, ‘to the extent that the total tax load on an individual can be fragmented so 
that he confronts numerous small levies rather than a few significant ones, illusory effects may be 
created’ (Buchanan 1967, pp. 135).   
2 For instance, as the population of the aged increases, spending on health, housing and social 
security rises with it (Feldstein, 1996). Similarly, spending on education increases as the population 
of the young increases (Marlow & Shiers 1999). 
3 This is because the future costs of such actions (i.e. possible reduction in future spending) 
may not be fully internalized (Battaglini & Coate 2006). This is what Lizzeri (1999) refers to as 
‘redistributive uncertainty’. 
4 For example, where there exists laws that determine spending thresholds, governments may 
design policies to cleverly escape such thresholds in order to be able to spend more (see Feld & 
Matsusaka 2003). 
5 We initially tested for multicollinearity among the independent variables using the VIF but find 
no support for it. These results are not reported for brevity but available upon request. 
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